


ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS

WINTER 1973



Ask what a chief executive does and you will likely be told that he “plans,” “organizes,” “coordinates,” and “controls.” In fact, these four words date back to 1916, when Henry Fayol first described the executive’s job. How useful are they? Consider the following sequence of activities, drawn from the actual work of chief executives:

As he enters his office at 8:23, the president’s secretary motions for him to pick up the telephone. “Jerry, there was a bad fire in the plant last night, about \$30,000 damage. We should be back in operation by Wednesday. Thought you should know.”

At 8:45, a Mr. Jamison is ushered into the president’s office. They discuss Mr. Jamison’s retirement plans and his cottage in New Hampshire. The president presents a plaque to him

commemorating his thirty-two years with the organization.

Mail processing follows: An innocent-looking letter, signed by a Detroit lawyer, reads, “A group of us in Detroit has decided not to buy any of your products because you used that anti-flag, anti-American pinko, Bill Lindell, on your Thursday night TV show.” The president dictates a restrained reply.

A 10:00 meeting is scheduled with a professional staffer. He claims that his superior, a high-ranking vice-president of the organization, mistreats his staff, and that if the man is not fired, they will all walk out. As soon as the meeting ends, the manager rearranges his schedule to investigate the claim and to react to this crisis.

Which of these activities should we call planning, and which organizing, coordinating, and controlling? Indeed, what do words such

A New Look at the Chief Executive's Job

Henry Mintzberg

as "coordinating" and "planning" mean in the context of real activity? In fact, these four words do not describe management work at all, but only certain of its vague objectives. They are convenient abstractions that we use to label our ignorance of the manager's job.

Over the years, a number of researchers have undertaken systematic studies of the work of managers, usually by having them fill out diaries or by actually observing them while they worked. Their studies, few of them widely reported, have focused on managers at all levels of the hierarchy and in every type of organization—Swedish managing directors; British presidents, middle managers, and foremen; American corporate and governmental chief executives; hospital administrators; foremen; street gang leaders; and many others. From an analysis of this research, and from my own detailed examination of the ways in which five chief executives spent their working time, a picture of the top executive's job emerges that is entirely different from the classical view of managerial work.

TEN BASIC MANAGERIAL ROLES

In the study of the chief executives of five middle- to large-size American organizations (a consulting firm, a consumer goods manufacturer, a technology firm, a hospital, and a school system), I recorded all the activities

that each performed during one week of intensive observation—a total of 368 verbal contacts and 890 pieces of mail during the five weeks. I then analyzed the reason for their participation in each, and developed from this analysis a framework of ten basic roles to describe their jobs.

The ten roles fall into three groupings. The "interpersonal" roles, of which there are three, describe aspects of the manager's work that involve interpersonal contact for its own sake. *Figurehead*, the simplest of roles, describes the manager as a symbol, required by the status of his office, to carry out a variety of social, legal, and ceremonial duties. He must preside at formal dinners, greet visiting dignitaries, sign various government forms, and make himself available to the important customers who believe that they merit the attention of the chief executive.

The *leader* role describes the manager's interpersonal relationship with his own subordinates, his need to hire, train, and motivate them. As leader, the manager must essentially bring their needs in accord with those of his organization.

The *liaison* role focuses on the manager's interpersonal dealings with people outside of his own organization. He spends a considerable amount of his time developing a network of high-status contacts in which information and favors are traded for mutual benefit. The chief executive joins boards of

directors, attends trade conferences, performs public service work all as part of his liaison role.

A second set of roles, again three in number, describe the activities the manager performs primarily to process information. In the *monitor* role, he continually seeks and receives information about his organization in order to understand his milieu thoroughly. Much of this information is privileged; he alone receives it because of the contacts he develops in his liaison role and because of his status in the leader role. In the *disseminator* role the manager shares some of this privileged information with his subordinates, and in the *spokesman* role he informs outsiders about the progress of his organization.

The last four roles describe the decision-making activities of the manager. As *entrepreneur* the manager takes responsibility for bringing about change in his organization. He looks for problems and opportunities, and he initiates projects to deal with them. As *disturbance handler*, the manager must take charge when his organization faces a major disturbance or crisis—the loss of a key executive, a strike, the destruction of a facility.

As *resource allocator*, the manager decides who will get what in his organization. He schedules his own time according to his priorities; he designs his organization, in effect deciding who will do what; and he authorizes all its important decisions. No major action can be taken without his approval, for he must take responsibility for it. Finally, as *negotiator* the manager takes charge whenever his organization must enter into crucial negotiations with other parties. His presence is required because he has the information and the authority to make the “real-time” decisions that difficult negotiations require.

Perhaps the most significant feature of these ten roles is that they are inseparable —they form a “Gestalt,” an integrated whole.

In effect, status, as manifested in the interpersonal roles, brings information to the chief executive, and it is this information (together with the status) that enables him to perform the decision-making roles effectively. This description appears to hold true for all chief executives—in my study, for example, a school superintendent in a stable milieu and a company president in a highly competitive consumer goods industry.

We do find, however, that different chief executives emphasize different roles. For example, the liaison role appears to be more important in service industries than in manufacturing—the president of a consulting firm feels obliged to spend substantial time with his firm’s clients. The presidents of small companies pay less attention to the figurehead role and other formal activities; they are more wrapped up in their firms’ operating problems and many spend a lot of time handling disturbances.

It is also interesting to note the difference between production managers, sales managers, and managers of staff groups. As it happens, each appears to concentrate on one set of roles. Production managers are most concerned with maintaining the workflow; they give their greatest attention to the decisional roles, especially disturbance handler and negotiator. In contrast, the sales manager is typically more extroverted. He spends much of his time in communication with clients and subordinates, and the interpersonal roles—liaison, leader, and figurehead—are most important to his job. Staff managers are experts as well as managers; they focus on the informational roles in an attempt to develop their expertise and to disseminate the expert advice of their specialists to those who need it.

In general, we can delineate different types of managerial jobs. For example, “contact man” managers spend much time with outsiders, “entrepreneurs” focus on change

and growth, "real-time" managers focus on day-to-day workflow problems, "team" managers are primarily concerned with leadership, and "new" managers spend most of their time developing contacts and trying to get information about a new job and a new milieu. But despite the obvious need for managers to focus on the particular roles most important to their particular jobs, all ten roles are a basic part of all senior managers' jobs. The relationships between interpersonal contact, information processing, and decision making are absolutely inseparable in the manager's work.

MAJOR FINDINGS ABOUT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE'S JOB

These ten roles suggest a number of key characteristics of the chief executive's job. In addition, studies of how these men operate—of the frequency and duration of meetings, their use of the mails, their pattern of activities over the work day—suggest a number of other characteristics of their work. I describe nine important characteristics below.

1. *The chief executive must serve as the key linking device between his organization and its environment.* In the liaison role the manager develops his high-status contacts, and in the spokesman and negotiator roles he deals with his organization's public. In effect, he uses his status in the maintenance of prime links with outsiders. This is not a grandiose task. It involves frequent, occasionally mundane, contact with all kinds of people—taking a big customer out to dinner, telling a congressional hearing why his firm acted as it did, negotiating with the workers over a major grievance, asking a friend to help in securing a contact.

2. *The chief executive is the nerve center of key information in his organization.* Consider the words of Richard Neustadt, who



Henry Mintzberg holds the position of Associate Professor, Management Policy, at Montreal's McGill University, and is currently a visiting professor at Carnegie-Mellon University. His doctoral degree was earned at the MIT Sloan School of Management. Dr. Mintzberg has consulted for business and government in Canada and the United States, has published extensively in the fields of policy and organization, and is currently engaged in researching the strategy formulation process. He has completed studies on the strategy of U.S. Government in Vietnam, Volkswagenwerk A. G., and The National Film Board of Canada.

The material for this article derives from his book, *The Nature of Managerial Work*, just published by Harper and Row.

in his book *Presidential Power* analyzed the activities of three U.S. Presidents:

The essence of Roosevelt's technique for information-gathering was competition. "He would call you in," one of his aides once told me, "and he'd ask you to get the story on some complicated business, and you'd come back after a couple of days of hard labor and present the juicy morsel you'd uncovered under a stone somewhere, and then

you'd find out he knew all about it, along with something else you didn't know. Where he got his information from he wouldn't mention, usually, but after he had done this to you once or twice you got damn careful about *your* information."

Now compare this with the comments of George Homans on a study of street gang leaders:

Since interaction flowed toward (the leaders), they were better informed about the problems and desires of group members than were any of the followers and therefore better able to decide on an appropriate course of action. Since they were in close touch with other gang leaders, they were also better informed than their followers about conditions in Cornerville at large. Moreover, in their position at the focus of the chains of interaction, they were better able than any follower to pass on to the group the decisions which had been reached.

At two extremes in the leadership spectrum, we can see a common bond. In both cases, the leaders are nerve centers of key organizational information. External information comes through the liaison role, and internal information, through the leader role. In effect, his position provides the manager with privileged information, and this information in turn provides him with much of his power. Note also that both quotes suggest that the manager's information system is not a formal one. In fact, there is considerable evidence that most of the manager's important information comes not from any official MIS but from the contacts and information channels he himself sets up. His brain, not the computer, is the data bank of key information in the organization.

3. *The chief executive must take full charge of his organization's strategy-making system.* The four decision-making roles suggest that the chief executive runs the strategy-making system in his organization—the system by which important decisions are made

and integrated. The president has unique authority and information, and no other member of his organization can take responsibility for these decisions. Decisions related to crises, problems, and major opportunities must be overseen and integrated by the chief executive.

4. *The chief executive performs much work at an unrelenting pace.* The first three points suggest the great responsibility that every chief executive assumes. He must run three complex systems in his organization—liaison, information processing, and strategy-making. This burden forces him to adopt an immense workload. Studies of chief executives find that they seldom stop working. Their evening activities are usually work related, and they seldom appear able to put their concern for their work aside. During office hours, the pace of work is hectic and, should free time become available, an ever-present pile of mail or an eager subordinate will quickly usurp it. This is not a job for reflection and relaxation. It is an openended job, with no tangible mileposts where the incumbent can stop and say, "Now my work is finished." The president must always keep going, never sure when he has succeeded, never sure when his whole organization might come down around him because of some miscalculation. Hence, he is a man with a perpetual preoccupation.

5. *The chief executive's work is characterized by brevity, discontinuity, and variety.* No matter what he is doing, the chief executive is plagued by what he might do and what he must do. Hence, he becomes conditioned by his pace and workload. He tries to keep all his activities brief, actively encouraging interruption in his work in order to maintain the rapid pace and the flow of information; he seeks variety in his work, again to maintain the pace. Studies of managerial activities highlight a surprising fragmentation of work. In

my study, the five chief executives averaged 36 written and 10 verbal contacts each day, almost every one dealing with a distinct issue. The significant issues were interspersed with trivial ones, requiring the managers to shift moods quickly and frequently. Fully half of the activities I observed were completed in less than nine minutes, and only one-tenth took more than one hour! (See page 26 for a detailed breakdown.) One study of a Swedish managing director found that only 12 times in 35 days did he work undisturbed in his office for more than 22 minutes! The top manager is encouraged by the realities of the job to make decisions abruptly, to maintain the hectic pace, to avoid wasting time.

6. *Chief executives gravitate to the more active, more concrete elements in their work.* In their work habits, they show strong preference for activities that are current, specific, and well-defined, and those that are nonroutine. As examples, in my study they gave little attention to routine operating reports; relatively few of their meetings were regularly scheduled; little of their time was devoted to open-ended touring; and almost never was a chief executive observed partaking in general, abstract discussion. As Neustadt noted in his study of three U.S. Presidents:

It is not information of a general sort that helps a President see personal stakes; not summaries, not surveys, not the *bland amalgams*. Rather . . . it is the odds and ends of *tangible detail* that pieced together in his mind illuminate the underside of issues put before him.

The chief executive is certainly not a planner in the accepted sense of that term. The pressures of the job simply do not allow for reflection. Rather the job breeds adaptive information manipulators, men who work in an environment of stimulus-response and who prefer live action.

7. *Chief executives demonstrate a preference for the verbal media.* Communication is the manager's work and his prime tools are five media—mail, telephone calls, unscheduled meetings, scheduled meetings, and tours. The first is a written form of communication, the last is observational, and the other three are verbal, involving different aspects of interpersonal contact. Virtually every study of managerial time allocation emphasizes the surprisingly large amount of time managers spend in verbal contact—talking and listening. Some 75 percent of the time of the five chief executives in my study was spent in verbal activities, the bulk of that in scheduled meetings. Top managers appear to dislike processing mail and reading. It is a slow, dull medium, containing little actionable material, and it doesn't fit in accordance with the stimulus-response nature of their work. In my study, I found that 87 percent of the chief executives' mail did not deal with issues of "live action." The tour provides the manager with an opportunity to observe activity first-hand; surprisingly, touring accounted for only 3 percent of the manager's time in my study and only 10 percent in a study of Swedish chief executives. Evidently, this activity is not specific and well defined enough for most managers. Telephone calls and meetings consume the bulk of the top manager's time; this is where the action of his managerial work is found.

8. *The prime occupational hazard of the chief executive's job is superficiality.* To summarize the previous points, the key problem facing the chief executive is that every pressure of his job drives him to be superficial. He is driven to overwork, to adapt an unrelenting pace, to fragment his work, to be abrupt, to avoid relaxed, reflective activities, to favor verbal communication over reading. Every pressure tells him to get it done quickly, not to probe, to avoid getting deeply involved.

ANALYSIS OF THE CHRONOLOGY RECORD
Based on five weeks of observation

Category	Composite	Mgr. A	Mgr. B	Mgr. C	Mgr. D	Mgr. E
Total Hours Worked	202 hrs	28 ^a	36	45	53	40
Hours in Travel to Outside Meetings (not included)	18 hrs	5.4	7.1	4.5	0.3	0.3
Hours of Evening Meetings (included)	24 hrs	—	3	3	7	11
Total Amount of Mail	890 pieces	161	165	230	222	112 ^b
Average Amount of Mail Processed Per Day	36 pieces	32	33	46	44	22 ^b
Total Number of Activities	547	101	86	96	160	104
Desk Work						
Number of sessions	179	36	31	25	54	33
Time on desk work	44 hrs	10.6	8.3	8.3	10.7	6.4
Average duration	15 min	18	16	20 ^c	12	12
Proportion of time	22%	38%	23%	18%	20%	16%
Telephone Calls^d						
Number of calls	133	27	27	30	22	27
Time on telephone	13 hrs	2.4	3.2	3.0	1.9	2.4
Average duration	6 min	5	7	6	5	5
Proportion of time	6%	9%	9%	7%	4%	6%
Scheduled Meetings						
Number of meetings	105	16	14	27	18	30
Time in meetings	120 hrs	10.6	20.6	29.1	29.5	29.8
Average duration	68 min	40	88	65	98	60
Proportion of time	59%	38%	57%	65%	55%	75%
Unscheduled Meetings						
Number of meetings	101	10	14	10	55	12
Time in meetings	20 hrs	1.7	3.5	4.0	9.6	1.2
Average duration	12 min	10	15	24	10	6
Proportion of time	10%	6%	10%	9%	18%	3%
Tours						
Number of tours	29	12	—	4	11	2
Time on tours	5 hrs	2.9	—	0.5	1.5	0.2
Average duration	11 min	14	—	8	8	6
Proportion of time	3%	10%	0%	1%	3%	1%
Proportion of Activities	49%	44%	40%	45%	56%	51%
Lasting Less Than 9 Min						
Proportion Lasting Longer Than 60 Min	10%	5%	12%	13%	9%	12%

^a It was decided to exclude a seven-hour trip that Manager A took to Washington in connection with congressional hearings.

^b Manager E commented that his mail was significantly lighter at the time of observation - the last week of classes.

^c Manager C spent Saturday processing much of his mail. He was largely uninterrupted, spending one 3.1 hour session and one 0.7-hour session. Excluding these, the average duration of his desk work sessions would have been 12 minutes.

^d Telephone calls screened or made by the secretary were excluded.

All this is reflected most clearly in the chief executive's "dilemma of delegation." He is forced to carry a great workload, yet he cannot easily delegate responsibility for his tasks. To delegate, he must send along the necessary information, but because so much of his information is in his memory, it takes much time to disseminate it. Hence, the top manager is often faced with the dilemma of doing it himself and adding to his workload or of delegating the task knowing it will be done by someone less informed than he. And so he comes under this immense pressure, and so superficiality becomes his prime occupational hazard.

9. *There is no science in managerial work.* Careful study of chief executive's activities demonstrate that there is as yet no science in their work. That is to say, managers do not work according to procedures that have been prescribed by scientific analysis. Indeed, except for using the telephone, the airplane, and the dictating machine, it would appear that the top manager of today is indistinguishable from his historical counterparts. He may seek different information, but he gets much of it in the same way—from word of mouth. He may make decisions dealing with modern technology, but he uses the same intuitive (that is, nonexplicit) procedures in making them. Even the computer, which has had such a great impact on other kinds of organizational work, has apparently done little to alter the working methods of the top manager.

The management scientist, despite his accomplishments in the fields of production and data processing, has done virtually nothing to change the senior manager's basic

working habits. The reason for all this is simply that we do not understand the intricate details of the top manager's job—the mental processes (or programs) he uses. And if we do not understand the job, how can we improve it or, for that matter, teach it in the classroom? Hence, despite all the talk about management science and despite all our investment in business school education, we must admit that we cannot really teach the essence of management. The job remains in the realm of intuitive thinking, and the world is full of highly successful top managers who have never spent one day in a management course.

FIVE POINTS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE MANAGING

There are no simple solutions to the dilemmas and problems facing the senior manager in his job. But these can be alleviated if he fully understands them and manages with a conscious recognition of them. Thus, introspection—to develop a better understanding of the job and its problems—is, in my view, the crucial ingredient for better managing. Five points that can lead to such an understanding and improvement are outlined below.

1. *Share privileged information.* The chief executive must recognize that he is the nerve center of important organizational information. He must further recognize that the power to make effective decisions stems directly from having this information. Hence, if the senior manager cannot effectively disseminate his information to his subordinates, he will be hesitant to delegate much of his

work, and he will therefore be seriously overworked. The difficulty, of course, is that because so much of the information is verbal, it takes much time to disseminate it. Written reports can be copied and circulated, verbal information cannot. Only the few subordinates who have frequent verbal contact with the chief executive really find out what is going on.

The top manager must make a concentrated effort to inform his subordinates—to tell them of the trade gossip, the anger of a big customer, the pressures brought to bear by a consumer group, his ideas for future development of product lines. Somehow he must document his information—take it out of his memory and put it on paper—so that it can be shared with others. In effect, he should debrief himself periodically. Many effective managers now do this; many others could benefit from the practice.

One objection to this proposal might be that some information is confidential and documenting it might expose it to the wrong people. But the risks of exposure must be weighed against the significant advantages of having a well-informed group of subordinates who can make effective, and compatible, decisions.

2. *Deal consciously with superficiality.* As noted above, it is too easy for the chief executive to operate on a continually superficial level, so that all issues are dealt with abruptly, as if none needs much attention. A top manager who is continually conscious of this problem will be able to alleviate it substantially. He will consider when he can act and when he must await further information, when he should take a decision in one large step and when it should be serialized over a period of time to allow for digestion, when he can move alone and when he must rely on the word of a subordinate. He will try to gain access to in-depth reports of issues, either by

reading them himself or by accepting the advice of experts. In particular, I believe that the management scientist has not been used sufficiently to analyze policy issues. The manager can improve the quality of his decisions significantly by getting the unbiased opinion of someone who has the time, skill, and inclination to do broad, basic analysis.

3. *Gain control of time.* Effective top managers appear to gain control of their own time in two ways. First, they make the most of their obligations. Managers must spend so much of their time discharging obligations that if they were to view them as just that, they would have little time to make effective changes. To an important extent, therefore, success derives from turning to their own advantage those things they must do. The shrewd top manager treats the chaos of a crisis as an opportunity to make some necessary changes. A mutiny in a department may be the opportunity to effect a needed reorganization; a drop in sales is a chance to overcome opposition to the dropping of old product lines. He uses a ceremonial speech as an opportunity to lobby for a cause; every time he meets a subordinate, no matter what the reason, he encourages him in his work; and every time he must meet an outsider, he tries to extract some useful information.

Second, the top manager must free himself from obligations to devote enough time to those issues that he (and perhaps no one else) believes should be attended to. The manager must seek a balance between change and stability in his organization. He is responsible for ensuring both that his organization produces today's goods and services efficiently and that it adapts to tomorrow's new environment. But the pressures of today's production may leave no time for tomorrow's changes. Between the mail, the callers, and the crises, not to mention the ever-hovering subordinates waiting for a free moment, the passive man-

ager will find no free time to address the major, but not pressing, issues.

"Free" time is made, not found, in the top manager's job. The manager must force it into his schedule. Many managers suffer from a "diary complex"—what does not get scheduled does not get done. Trying to keep some time open for contemplation or for general "planning" will not work. The top manager is not a planner in a reflective sense, and no amount of admonition in the literature will make him so. His milieu is one of stimulus-response. He must schedule these specific things he wants to do; then he will be obliged to do them. If he wishes to innovate, he must initiate a project and involve others who will report back to him; if he wishes to tour facilities, he must commit himself so that others expect him to do so. Then, he will serve his own organization's broader ends while continuing to manage as he must.

4. *See the comprehensive picture in terms of its details.* The top manager faces a kind of jigsaw puzzle. Always working with small pieces, he must never forget the whole picture. The manager must inform himself by piecing together tangible details—the action by a competitor, the new interest rate, the conflict between two executives, the new process technology, the depletion of a natural resource. The danger, however, is that in his search for tangible detail, the manager may be unable to see the broad issues. He may be unable to abstract himself from the details of the present, or he may not be able to reconcile the new details with his old, broad views. A government leader may operate with a model of the economy that is no longer valid; a company president may operate with an outmoded model of what motivates his workers. The top manager must expose himself directly to the models of specialists from time to time, not necessarily to accept their view of reality, but at least to compare it with his own.

5. *Use the management scientist.* The main message of this paper is that top managers have the information and the authority to make effective decisions, but they often lack the time and the concentration that complex issues require. Alternately, the management scientist—planner, operations researcher, information systems expert, and so on—has the time to concentrate and the techniques of analysis, but lacks the authority and the information. Hence, there exists what I have elsewhere called a "planning dilemma." An effective relationship between top manager and management scientist will require a concerted effort on the part of both parties. The senior manager will have to help the management scientist to understand his work and his problems; he will have to make more room in his decision-making processes for inputs from systematic, comprehensive investigation; and, most important, he will have to transmit his crucial, verbal information to the analyst.

For his part, the management scientist will have to better understand the complex dynamic factors of the top manager's job—the crises, the need for timing and delays, the inherent ambiguity of strategic decisions. He will have to learn to forego elegance in his techniques—strategy issues require clever, systematic analysis, but few of them are well-structured enough to allow for the use of sophisticated techniques. The top manager needs someone with time and a clear head, not a grab bag of fancy tricks.

There are a number of areas where manager and analyst can cooperate. In the design of information systems, for example, the top manager has traditionally been provided with precisely the kind of information he does not seek or need—routine, historical, quantitative information. Hence, top managers design their own informal information systems. But the analyst can put together the kind of formal systems senior managers need

—as soon as he seriously studies what information they actually use, and as soon as he recognizes that the computer need not be the heart of the manager's information system. In fact, the senior manager has great need for an in-between MIS—formal and systematic, but not quantitative or computerized. Analysts would collect and feed to the top manager some of the intelligence information he needs—the events of the trade, significant changes in the organization, relevant actions by the government, new ideas of competitors, and so on. Some of this information is privileged, available only to the manager. But some is not, and it should be collected by specialists.

In the area of strategy making, there are numerous fruitful opportunities for manager-analyst cooperation. Cost benefit or return on investment analysis has not been used nearly enough to analyze complex strategy issues. A properly oriented, well-informed team of management scientists could do much good here. In the area of long-range planning, we have read too much about a simple, static process. Senior managers need adaptive plans that reflect their need to time moves and to shift parameters in midstream. They need contingency plans to deal with devastating events that may or may not occur. And when faced with a crisis or a high-pressure situation, the top manager can use a team of analysts who are prepared to do a quick-and-dirty analysis—to feed him with the analysis of the situation and the broad perspective of the issue while it is still alive.

The payoff from manager-management scientist cooperation can be immense, provided both parties can learn to work together. Such cooperation can finally lead us out of the vacuum in management thought that continues to plague us in this age of sophisticated technology.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Readers interested in more depth on the issues covered in this article and in an extensive review of the literature on the manager's job, can see my book, *The Nature of Managerial Work* (due to be published in January, 1973 by Harper and Row). This book also analyzes the unique features of different types of managerial jobs and discusses at length the role of management science at the policy level.

Three books particularly influenced me in my study. *Managerial Behavior* by Leonard Sayles (McGraw-Hill, 1964) presents a penetrating analysis of the complex pressures facing middle managers, while *Presidential Power* by Richard Neustadt (New American Library, 1964) does the same for the U.S. Presidency. In particular, Neustadt analyzes the use of power by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower. In *Managers and their Jobs*, Rosemary Stewart presents the results of a study, using the diary method, of the work of 160 senior and middle managers in Britain. Each of these three books successfully dispels traditional notions of the manager's work.

A further complement to these views is the work of Charles Lindblom of Yale University, even though his books concern decision-making rather than managerial work. His books should be considered required reading for any executive who feels the need for another opinion on how policies really are formulated in organizations. Lindblom writes about government, but businessmen will have little difficulty recognizing their own behavior here. Executives will find *The Policy-Making Process* (Prentice-Hall, 1968) the most readable of Lindblom's works.

Finally, a provocative article by H. E. Wrapp, entitled "Good Managers Don't Make Policy Decisions" (Harvard Business Review, September-October, 1967) is easy and relevant reading for all chief executives.

